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Abstract: This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim
to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferen-
tialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and
placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2
focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case
for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case
of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits of logical
inferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider
a number of objections. §3 introduces and critically examines the most influen-
tial and most fully developed form of global inferentialism: Robert Brandom’s
inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in
§4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible
responses on the inferentialist’s behalf.
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There are two prima facie opposing tendencies in philosophical work con-
cerning linguistic meaning and mental content: ‘referential’ approaches and
‘use-theoretic’ approaches. According to referential approaches the semantic
properties of linguistic expressions and concepts are primarily to be explained
in terms of the (broadly) referential relations they bear to (typically) extra-
linguistic things (objects, sets thereof, instantiations of properties, etc.). In
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the case of language, referential relations are understood in terms of map-
pings from linguistic expressions to the corresponding semantic values in
accordance with their semantic types: proper names are mapped onto the
appropriate objects, simple predicates might be associated with the properties
they designate, and so on. Our use of linguistic expressions is then explained
in terms of these referential semantic properties: we use the expressions of
our language as we do because of their referential properties. A roughly
analogous story, it is generally thought, can be told about thought. Use the-
ories of meaning, in contrast, reverse the order of explanation. According
to them, it is regularities or rules of use that take center stage. It is these
regularities and rules that are accorded explanatory primacy in accounting
for meaning and conceptual content, and customary semantic notions such as
reference, truth and satisfaction are explained as a by-product of them. Thus,
linguistic practice precedes and shapes semantic theory rather than the other
way around.
Plausibly, on a use-theoretic approach, not all aspects of an expression’s or
a concept’s use are equally explanatorily relevant. Accordingly, use theories
of meaning differ over which features of an expression’s use does most of
the explanatory work. Our focus in this article is with the particular class of
use theories that gives inference pride of place in their account of meaning.
Use theories of meaning of this sort are commonly known as inferential role
semantics (IRS) or inferentialism for short. IRS is a species of conceptual role
semantics. On a broad understanding of it, conceptual role semantics includes
‘any theory that holds that the content of mental states or symbols is deter-
mined by any part of their role or use in thought’ (Harman and Greenberg
2006, 295). IRS, as we conceive of it, restricts the semantically relevant features
of an expression’s conceptual role to the regularities or proprieties of inference
(or to some particular sub-class of these). The meaning of ‘and’, for instance,
is often said to be determined by the rules of inference governing it. And to
understand ‘and’, i.e. to know what ‘and’ means, is to infer according to such
rules.
In this article, we introduce IRS and some of the challenges it faces. We
aim to provide a map of the terrain which offers an overview, but also chal-
lenges some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. Our discussion
is structured thus. §1 introduces inferentialism and places it into the wider
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context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is stan-
dardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural
application of IRS: logical inferentialism, the view that the meanings of the
logical expressions are fully determined by the basic rules for their correct
use, and that to understand a logical expression is to use it in accordance with
the appropriate rules. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits of logical in-
ferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider a
number of objections. §3 introduces and critically examines Robert Brandom’s
inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in
§4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible
responses on the inferentialist’s behalf.
1 Varieties of inferentialism
Inferentialism is a broad church. In this section, we introduce what we take to
be its main varieties, and place them in the wider context of contemporary
philosophy of language.
To begin, IRS might be thought to serve as a theory of linguistic meaning.
As such, it might be thought of as a theory of the meanings of expressions
in a public language. Alternatively, it might be taken to be an account of the
meanings of expressions in someone’s idiolect, or as an account of the contents
of symbols in a language of thought, or again it might be thought of as an
account of the content of thought.
Some clarification concerning the intended sense of ‘thought’ is in order.
Thoughts, as we will understand them, are the sorts of things that can be
grasped or entertained. Thoughts are commonly thought to be composed
of concepts displaying something resembling syntactic structure. It follows
that thoughts so understood differ from theories that construe propositions
as ‘unstructured’, e.g. theories that identify propositions with sets of pos-
sible worlds. Thoughts differ also from Russellian propositions, which are
composed of the objects, properties and relations they are about. As Timothy
Williamson puts it, ‘a thought about Vienna contains the concept of Vienna,
not Vienna itself’ (Williamson 2006, 2). If Fregean accounts of propositions
are correct, then thoughts may be propositions. If they are not, thoughts may
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still express propositions. Though we will not take a stand on these issues
here, laying out the options and situating our talk of meaning and conceptual
content within them should clarify the discussion to follow.
It is a further question how certain aspects of either of the three aforemen-
tioned kinds of meaning—meanings of public language expressions, mean-
ings of idiolectal expressions, and meanings of expressions of a language
of thought—relate to conceptual content. Some advocates of IRS maintain
that mastery of public linguistic meaning is conceptually prior to conceptual
content; that one can only have concepts (or at least concepts of any degree
of sophistication) once one has grasped the meanings of the corresponding
linguistic expressions by knowing how to use them (Dummett 1991, 1993;
Sellars 1956). Others hold the weaker view that linguistic meaning is method-
ologically prior to conceptual content, or at least that thought and talk must
go hand-in-hand in that they must be accounted for in unison (Brandom 1994;
Davidson 1984, Harman 1999). Thus, on most forms of IRS, the only way to
account for conceptual content is by way of an account of linguistic mean-
ing. The thought, usually, is that concepts can only be attributed to creatures
capable of manifesting them, and that linguistic competence is required in
order to do so. But that is not to say that all inferentialist accounts abide
by this language-first methodology. Loar (1981) and Peacocke (1992) both
advance views whereupon inferential roles determine mental content, but
where linguistic meaning is parasitic on mental content. Linguistic meaning
might then be derived from mental contents according to roughly Gricean
lines (Grice 1957). With this point being noted, in the following we will allow
ourselves to slide from (linguistic) meaning talk to (conceptual) content talk.
We have presented referential semantics and use-theoretic semantics (and
IRS in particular) as two ‘prima facie opposing’ approaches to meaning and
conceptual content. Treating them as opposing alternatives is common prac-
tice and indeed partisans on either side often proclaim their opposition to
the other side. However, as we have also noted, the difference between IRS
and referentialism need not necessarily reveal itself at the level of seman-
tic theory; rather, it is a difference in the order of explanation: ‘Are (broadly)
referential relations explanatorily prior to inferential ones or does the order
of explanation run in the opposite direction?’ And this question is in fact a
metasemantic question, not a semantic one. The underlying distinction at play
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here comes to this. Semantics concerns itself with the question of which types
of semantic values to assign to different categories of expressions, and how,
on the basis of these assignments, the semantic values of complex expressions
are functionally determined by the semantic values of their constituent ex-
pressions. Metasemantics,1 in contrast, asks two questions: the metaphysical
question as to what makes it the case that a given expression has the semantic
value it does; and the epistemological question as to what a speaker needs to
know to count as understanding the expression. Whence our claim that IRS
is not incompatible with a referential semantics. It is incompatible with the
metasemantic thesis that referential relations precede inferential ones in the
order of explanation.
A proponent of IRS could thus in principle adhere to a referential semantic
theory—i.e. one that deals in the ordinary semantic concepts of reference, truth
and satisfaction and which assigns the customary (typically) extra-linguistic
items as semantic values, while at the same time staying true to the spirit of
IRS. IRS might then be interpreted as a metasemantic thesis—a thesis about
what it is in virtue of which an expression has the semantic value it does (what
it is in virtue of which a concept has the content it does) or a thesis about what
it takes to understand an expression (grasp a concept), or both. IRS, on this
metasemantic interpretation, gives rise to the following two broad theses:
(MD) Meaning determination. The meanings of linguistic expressions
are determined by their role in inference.
(UND) Understanding. To understand a linguistic expression is to
know its role in inference.2
Thus, a position that takes referential semantics at face-value and appeals to
IRS as a source for answers to metasemantic questions is at least conceivable.
That being said, given the explanatory priority IRS accords to inferential over
referential relations, IRS paves the way for non-standard semantic theories.
This may be either because it is thought that IRS constrains semantic theory in
such a way as to necessitate the assignment of non-standard semantic values
(e.g. assertibility conditions instead of truth conditions or an epistemically
constrained notion of truth in the case of anti-realist theories of meaning like
those of Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright, etc.); or it may be because it is felt
that substantive relations of reference and truth are not warranted or perhaps
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not needed once an IRS account of meaning has been offered.3 Let us call IRS
accounts coupled with ‘standard’ semantic theories orthodox, and unorthodox
otherwise. Moreover, let us call genuine those orthodox accounts that take the
semantic concepts featured in the semantic theory at face value, and orthodox
accounts that are not genuine, deflationary.
To bring out some of the characteristic features common to all forms of
IRS as well as some of the features by which different of its variants distin-
guish themselves from one another, it will be helpful to contrast IRS with a
theory that is straightforwardly incompatible with it. Now, as a species of
use-theoretic account, IRS is at odds with any account that takes expressions
of a language or concepts to come, as it were, pre-equipped with meanings
or contents. Views that run under the banner of informational semantics
are a case in point. Roughly, advocates of informational semantics maintain
that semantic concepts are to be explained in terms of certain lawlike cor-
relations linking external things or property instantiations to tokenings of
corresponding linguistic items or to mental items (Fodor, 1990; Dretske, 2000).
The primary mode of semantic explanation thus proceeds by establishing ‘di-
rect’ language-world mappings. Once the reference and designation relations
are established by way of the said reliable correlations between linguistic
or mental items and their external causal antecedents, the usual semantic
concepts (reference, truth, satisfaction, etc.) are simply explained from the
‘bottom up’: first, names are associated with their bearers, unary predicates
with the properties designated and so on. In a second step, the theory then
specifies compositional rules for determining the semantic values of more
complex expressions as a function of their semantically relevant component
parts. This atomistic mode of explanation is more congenial to certain types
of expressions than it is to others. Paradigmatic cases of linguistic expressions
that particularly lend themselves to information semantic explanation are
observational predicates (‘square’, ‘red’) and proper names.
If the prototypical expressions for informational semantical treatment are
observational predicates and proper names, the paradigm case for IRS are
logical expressions (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’, etc.). The semantic values of logical ex-
pressions are not readily explained in terms of correlations that may obtain
between tokenings of them and external referential relata. Rather, the inferen-
tialist will maintain, the meanings of logical expressions are determined, first
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and foremost, by their inferential properties which are encapsulated in the
rules governing paradigmatic inferences involving them. Taking the case of
logical expressions as its model, IRS takes the bulk of the explanatory work
to be done by intra-linguistic (or language-language) relations (as opposed
to by direct language-world links). Moreover, while information semantics
and kindred approaches proceed from the bottom up as we have seen, the
inferentialist mode of explanation is top down: simple declarative sentences
are the primary semantic units, for it is the propositions expressed by them
that stand in inferential relations. The meanings of subsentential expressions
are determined by the contributions these expressions make to the inferen-
tial roles the sentences containing them participate in (see Dummett, 1991;
Brandom, 1994).
The inferentialist mode of semantic explanation might be thought to apply
locally, i.e. to restricted regions of language such as logical, moral, causal,
deontic, epistemic or theoretical terms; or it might be advanced as a global
thesis according to which the inferential model of explanation extends to
language at large. In order to be able to accommodate expressions that are
less straightforwardly explained in inferential terms, global inferentialists
will have to include ‘language-entry’ and ‘language-exit’ rules (Sellars, 1953)
among the relevant ‘inferential’ connections. That is, uses of expressions
like observational predicates will have to be linked to perceptual cues (on
the ‘entry’ side), and they must link up with intentional action (on the ‘exit’
side). In the absence of any such anchoring of meaning in our experience and
interaction with the world, our inferential language game threatens to fail
to “latch onto the world”, it could not serve as a means for representing the
world. We will be examining local versions of IRS in §2, while global accounts
of IRS will occupy us in §3.
The comparison of IRS with information semantics is telling also in other
respects. For one, it may be noted that information semantics naturally en-
trains semantic atomism. As Fodor (1990) has stressed, it is possible (at least in
principle) on such views that a creature should possess but one concept. Since
concept possession depends on being suitably related to the environment,
having a concept need not presuppose the possession of others. Things look
different when viewed through the prism of IRS, which is incompatible with
semantic atomism. The content of a concept is determined by its connections
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to other suitably inferentially related concepts. Hence, one cannot so much as
have a concept without having many concepts.4 IRS is thus compatible with,
but does not mandate, semantic holism—the position that a statement’s mean-
ing (and derivatively the meanings of the sub-sentential expressions figuring
within it) is determined by the entire network of inferential connections in
which it participates. Whether a particular form of IRS endorses holism and
how far-reaching that holism is will depend on which types of inferences are
taken to be determinative of meaning. If all inferential links—mediate as well
as immediate ones—are to taken into account, IRS will amount to an all-out
or ‘pandemic’ holism: the meaning of one statement is fixed by its place in
the network of inferential connections linking it to all other statements ex-
pressible in the language. By contrast, some versions of IRS treat only certain
more restricted sub-classes of inferences: analytic inferences or inferences
that display a particular counterfactual robustness (Sellars, op. cit.). Michael
Dummett’s ‘molecularism’ is, as the name makes plain, a further attempt of
carving out a middle ground between atomism and holism. The molecularist
thus allows for what we might call semantic clusters. A semantic cluster is a
set of expressions or phrases that are mutually dependent in the sense that
the meaning of any member of the set is determined by its inferential links
to all the others in the set. Examples are groups of contrary predicates like
color words or phrases like ‘mother of’, ‘father of’, ‘child of’. Famously, ac-
cording to Quine the expressions ‘analytic’, ‘necessary’, ‘synonymous’ also
form a cluster. What the molecularist opposes is the holist notion that all of
these clusters collapse into one all-encompassing master cluster, language as
a whole.
Typically, strongly holistic versions of IRS are less apt to answer the epis-
temological question underlying UND: ‘What is it that a speaker must know
in order to count as understanding an expression?’ For, while all-out holism
may be a candidate explanation of how it is, metaphysically speaking, that
expressions of a language have the meanings they do, it does not deliver
a plausible criterion of linguistic understanding. Transferred to an episte-
mological key, a strongly holistic version of IRS amounts to the thesis that a
speaker must somehow grasp the entirety of the inferential network of links
obtaining between all the statements expressible in the language. A claim
that seems incredible. Not only would no human speaker of any non-trivial
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language qualify as understanding any expressions of her language, it also
seems deeply unintuitive that my understanding of ‘measurable cardinal’
(say) should be tied to my appreciation of the correctness of the inference from
the proposition that Puck is a cat to the proposition that Puck is an animal.
Thus, advocates of IRS qua account of linguistic understanding are likely to
opt for a non-holistic variant of IRS.5 The same goes for philosophers who,
like Dummett, believe that MD and UND are inseparable, that a theory of
meaning is of necessity a theory of what it is a speaker must know in order to
understand the expressions of the language. In the following, when we wish
to speak of the meaning-determinative or understanding-constituting class of
inferential connections in a way that is neutral both with respect to the degree
of holistic dependence, we speak of the salient class of inferences.
Another important choice point is whether IRS is to be interpreted de-
scriptively or normatively. On a descriptive reading of IRS, the salient class of
inferences is constituted by the inferential connections speakers actually make
or are disposed to make or accept under various actual and counterfactual
circumstances.6 On a normative reading, MD and UND are understood in
terms of the inferential connections we ought to be disposed to make or accept.
As Daniel Whiting (2006) emphasizes, the normativity in question involved is
not merely consequent upon an expression’s having a certain meaning. For
instance, that ‘cat’ means cat may have the implication that one ought to apply
‘cat’ to all and only cats. The case of normative versions of IRS is different.
The normativity of the salient class of inferential roles is part and parcel of
the meanings they determine: it is because one is in some appropriate sense
disposed to recognize the propriety of the inferential connections that one (the
community) means what one (it) does by a given expression. Similarly, under-
standing an expression consists in recognizing the propriety of the relevant
set of inferential connections.7
This brings us back to another important distinction: the distinction,
namely, between individualistic and social (or anti-individualistic) interpre-
tations of IRS. MD, for instance, might be thought of a thesis about the
determination of meanings of a particular speaker’s idiolect (at a particular
time), or it might be interpreted as a thesis about how the meanings of a
public language are fixed. The former thesis is compatible with internalistic
conceptions of meaning according to which the determinants of meaning
9
are intrinsic properties of the speaker. Aside from all-out internalism, such
views are compatible also with so-called two-factor views. Two-factor views
distinguish two aspects of meanings: narrow and broad content. While broad
content may be partly determined by the speaker’s social or physical environ-
ment, narrow content is understood internalistically. Within such a two-factor
view, the individualistic reading of an IRS-based thesis about meaning deter-
mination might be appealed to as an account of narrow content. In contrast,
the anti-individualistic interpretation of IRS is compatible with a social exter-
nalism (Burge 1979, 1986; Putnam 1981). It is less clear that such views can
accommodate twin-earth-type arguments in favor of physical externalism—
the view that the meanings of certain expressions, typically proper names
and natural kind terms, are in part individuated by their physical environ-
ment. For example, in Putnam’s classic thought experiment (Putnam 1975)
the meaning-determining inferential roles for ‘water’ are identical in Oscar’s
and in Twin Oscar’s linguistic communities. All the same, ‘water’ presumably
picks out different substances and hence has different meanings (assuming
that meanings determine referents). Some versions of conceptual role semantics
(incorporated into one-factor views of content) allow for so-called ‘long-arm
roles’, which ‘reach out’, so to speak, to include the speaker’s physical envi-
ronment and her causal interactions within the speaker’s conceptual roles
(Harman 1987).Some accept such ‘long-arm roles’ within IRS. Advocates of
IRS who do not—while maintaining that inferential roles determine reference
and truth-conditions—will either have to restrict IRS to types of expressions
where the physical externalist intuitions have less of a foothold or they will
have to dispute those intuitions altogether.
Now, we have said that some proponents of IRS are motivated by MD.
But what does it mean to say that inferential roles determine meanings? A
fully worked out account of IRS must clarify two things: the relation of deter-
mination involved, and the notion of meaning appealed to. Begin with the
first of these tasks. On perhaps the most straightforward reading, meanings
might simply be identified with inferential roles or rules of inference. Alterna-
tively, meanings might be taken to supervene on inferential roles in the sense
that identity of inferential roles guarantees identity of meanings. Or perhaps
there are other more sophisticated ways in which inferential roles determine
meanings (we will consider one such account in §3).
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The second task is not independent of the first. Whether meanings can be
identified with inferential roles, for instance, will depend on what meanings
are. We consider four uses of ‘meaning’. First, ‘meaning’ may be used to
designate the referent or extension of an expression. Second, the meaning of
an expression may be equated with the compositional contribution it makes
to what is said by a sentence in which it is being used. Third, meanings have
sometimes been thought to be the semantic determinants of the referent or
extension of an expression. On simple descriptivist accounts, the meaning
of a proper name (say) may be a definite description (or cluster of such
descriptions). It is in virtue of the description’s being satisfied by a particular
object, that the associated name names its bearer. Fourth, and finally, ‘meaning’
is often used to designate what it is that a speaker must grasp in order to
understand it.
Here is not the place for a comprehensive survey of all of the combinatorial
possibilities. Nevertheless a handful of examples will give the reader an
impression of the clarificatory work necessary to fully spell out a version
of inferentialism. For instance, inferential roles cannot be identified with
meaning in the first sense of ‘meaning’, since what we talk about when we
talk about Saul Kripke or aardvarks are people and perhaps kinds, properties
or classes of objects, not inferential roles. Similarly, if meaning is understood
as the semantic contribution to what is said by a sentence, then if what is said
by sentence is a Russellian proposition or a proposition conceived of as a set of
possible worlds, inferential roles, again, cannot be identified with meanings.
It is at least conceivable, by contrast, that inferential roles are (or otherwise
determine) that which determines reference, or that they are what a speaker
needs to master in order to understand an expression having those inferential
roles. Completing the survey would require a similar analysis of other forms
of meaning determination.
Enough, then, about IRS’s place in the landscape of contemporary ap-
proaches in the philosophy of language. The next two sections focus on,
respectively, the arguably most important local version of IRS, logical inferen-
tialism, and Brandom’s global inferentialism.
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2 Logical inferentialism
Though various local brands of IRS have been advanced, logical inferentialism,
IRS as it applies to logical vocabulary deserves special attention. Inferentialist
accounts of logical expressions, we noted, seem especially natural. As a result,
such accounts are often regarded as a model for IRS in general. As Brandom
puts it, typically inferentialists ‘look to the contents of logical concepts as
providing the key to understanding conceptual content generally’ (Brandom
2007, 161). We begin by introducing some of logical inferentialism’s standard
motivations and commitments (§§2.1-2). We then discuss a response inspired
by Gerhard Gentzen’s work to Arthur Prior’s famous attempt to undermine
the view, and consider a potential corollary of Gentzen’s response, viz. that
logical inferentialism validates a non-classical logic (§§2.3-4).
2.1 The only game in town?
Inferentialists frequently distinguish two central aspects of the correct use
of a sentence: the conditions under which it may correctly asserted, and the
consequences that may be correctly derived from (an assertion of) it. As
Dummett puts it:
crudely expressed, there are always two aspects of the use of a
given form of sentence: the conditions under which an utterance
of that sentence is appropriate, which include, in the case of an
assertoric sentence, what counts as an acceptable ground for assert-
ing it; and the consequences of an utterance of it, which comprise
both what the speaker commits himself to by the utterance and the
appropriate response on the part of the hearer, including, in the
case of assertion, what he is entitled to infer from it if he accepts it.
(Dummett 1973, 396)
On their most common interpretation, introduction rules in a natural deduc-
tion system (henceforth, I-rules) state the sufficient , and perhaps necessary,
conditions for introducing complex sentences; elimination rules (henceforth,
E-rules) tell us what can be legitimately deduced from any such sentence.
Logical inferentialism, then, becomes the claim that the meanings of logical
expressions are fully determined by their I- and E-rules (corresponding to MD
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above), and that to understand such expressions is to use them according to
such rules (corresponding to UND).8
The idea that rules can fix meanings became increasingly popular in the
30’s and 40’s. For logical expressions, the strategy is an especially tempting
one. For one thing, one can prove that, if ∧ satisfies its I- and E-rules
A B∧-I
A ∧ B
A ∧ B∧-E
A
A ∧ B .
B
and if the rules are truth-preserving, then sentences of the form pA ∧ Bqmust
have their standard truth-conditions:
(∧) pA ∧ Bq is true iff pAq is true and pBq is true.9
For another, a speaker who did not master ∧-I and ∧-E can hardly be credited
with an understanding of conjunction. And, conversely, it would seem to be a
mistake not to attribute an understanding of conjunction to a speaker who did
master ∧-I and ∧-E. Indeed, what else could account for one’s understanding
of logical expressions? As Paul Boghossian puts it:
It’s hard to see what else could constitute meaning conjunction by
‘and’ except being prepared to use it according to some rules and
not others (most plausibly, the standard introduction and elimi-
nation rules for ‘and’). Accounts that might be thought to have
a chance of success with other words—information-theoretic ac-
counts, for example, or explicit definitions, or teleological accounts—
don’t seem to have any purchase in the case of the logical constants.
(Boghossian 2011, 493)
Accordingly, the view that for logical expressions inferentialism is the only
game in town, is widely shared.
Boghossian offers a second argument in favour of logical inferentialism,
viz., that it makes for an elegant account of blind but blameless reasoning—
one that seeks to explain how justification (or knowledge) can be transmitted
from premises to the conclusion in deductive inference. In a nutshell, any
such account is constrained by the failures of simple inferential internalism
(SII) and simple inferential externalism (SIE). According to SII, it is required
not only that (i) I be justified in believing the premises of a deductive inference
and (ii) that the conclusion be justified independently of the premises, but
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also (iii) that I can know by reflection alone that the premises provide me
with good grounds for believing the conclusion. SII amounts to a form of
access internalism about deductive inferential justification. Aside from (i)
and (ii), SIE requires (iv) that the pattern of inference exemplified be valid
(necessarily truth-preserving). Boghossian’s proposal is to suggest instead
that our inferences are blind, because we cannot be expected to satisfy (iii), on
pain of starting an infinite regress or else invoking dubious faculties of rational
insight. But it is also not enough that our inferences satisfy (iv) since inferences
may be reckless and hence blameworthy despite being truth-preserving. So,
justification transferral must admit of blind and blameless inferences:
a deductive pattern of inference P may be blamelessly employed,
without any reflective appreciation of its epistemic status, just in
case inferring according to P is a precondition for having one of
the concepts ingredient in it. (Boghossian 2003, 239)
The fact that I take A thoughts to be a warrant for believing B thoughts is
constitutive of my having these thoughts (A or B) at all. But, then, how can
I be epistemically blameworthy for making such an inference? We return to
this admittedly controversial argument in §4 below.
The resulting view, then, is an analytic approach to logic—one according
to which logical truths are epistemically analytic (Boghossian 1996, 2003): if A
expresses a logical truth, then the proposition it expresses can be known on
the basis of a grasp of the meaning of the sentence alone. Whether logical
inferentialism is also committed to a metaphysical conception of analyticity—
one according to which logical truths owe their truth solely to the meanings
of the logical expressions (and to the facts)—is more controversial (see e.g.
Russell 2014, Warren 2015).
2.2 Harmony
Logical inferentialism is a form of conventionalism: certain logical laws, the
thought goes, are stipulated to hold or else somehow extracted from our
practice. Thus, Dummett writes:
Although it is not true of logical laws generally that we are entitled
simply to stipulate that they shall be treated as valid, there must
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be certain laws or systems of laws of which this holds good. Such
laws will be ‘self-justifying’: we are entitled simply to stipulate
that they shall be regarded as holding, because by so doing we fix,
wholly or partly, the meanings of the logical constants that they
govern. (Dummett 1991, 246)
The thought seems to be this: while in the overwhelming majority of cases
the question whether we may accept a certain logical law is already settled (it
depends on whether the given law can be derived from laws that are already
accepted), basic laws cannot be justified in this way, on pain of an infinite
regress. The question arises, however, whether any seemingly basic law can
be regarded as determinative of meaning.
An affirmative answer yields disaster, as Arthur Prior’s infamous binary
connective tonk shows (see Prior 1960):
A
tonk-I
A tonk B
A tonk B
tonk-E .
B
If the consequence relation is transitive, and at least one theorem can be
proved in one’s system, then any sentence can be proved in one’s system.
To the best of our knowledge, the first sketch of an inferentialist solution to
the problem was given by Gerhard Gentzen in 1934. In a famous passage,
Gentzen writes:
To every logical symbol &, ∨, ∀, ∃, →, ¬, belongs precisely one
inference figure which ‘introduces’ the symbol—as the terminal
symbol of a formula—and which ‘eliminates’ it. The fact that the
inference figures &-E and ∨-I each have two forms constitutes
a trivial, purely external deviation and is of no interest. The in-
troductions represent, as it were, the ‘definitions’ of the symbols
concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in the final analy-
sis, than the consequences of these definitions. This fact may be
expressed as follows: in eliminating a symbol, we may use the
formula with whose terminal symbol we are dealing only ‘in the
sense afforded it by the introduction of that symbol’. (Gentzen
1934, 80)
Gentzen argues that the I-rules of his newly invented calculus of natural
deduction ‘fix’, or ‘define’, the meanings of the expressions they introduce.
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He also observes that, on this assumption, E-rules cannot be chosen randomly.
They must be justified by the corresponding I-rules: they are, in some sense,
their ‘consequences’. This key thought expresses in nuce the idea that I- and
E-rules must be, in Dummett’s phrase, in harmony with each other. Conversely,
if it is thought that E-rules are meaning-constitutive, I-rules cannot be chosen
arbitrarily either (see e.g. Dummett 1991, 215).
This intuitive idea can be spelled out in a number of ways. Dummett (1991,
250) and Prawitz (1974, 76) define harmony as the possibility of eliminating
maximum formulae or local peaks, i.e. formulae that occur both as the conclusion
of an I-rule and as the major premise of the corresponding E-rule (see also
Prawitz 1965, 34). The following reduction procedure for →, for instance,
shows that any proof of B via→-I and→-E can be converted into a proof from
the same or fewer assumptions that avoids the unnecessary detour through
(the introduction and elimination of) A→ B:
Γ0, [A]i
Π0
B→-I, i
A→ B
Γ1
Π1
A→-E
B
 r
Γ1
Π1
Γ0, A︸︷︷︸
Π0
B
where r reads ‘reduces to’. Dummett (1991, 250) calls the availability of
such procedures intrinsic harmony where, crucially, the reduction reduces the
degree of complexity of a derivation, i.e. the number of occurrences of logical
operators. He correctly points out, though, that it only prevents elimination
rules from being stronger than the corresponding introductions, as in the case
of Prior’s tonk. It does not rule out the possibility that they be, so to speak,
too weak (see Dummett 1991, 287).10 A way to ensure that E-rules be strong
enough is to require that they allow us to reintroduce complex sentences, as
shown by the following expansion:
Π
A ∧ B  e
Π
A ∧ B ∧-E
A
Π
A ∧ B ∧-E
B ∧-I
A ∧ B
where e reads ‘can be expanded into’. This shows that any derivation Π of
A ∧ B can be expanded into a longer derivation which makes full use of both
∧-I and ∧-E. Accordingly, a pair of I- and E-rules for a constant $ can be taken
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to be harmonious iff there exists both reduction and expansion procedures for
$-I and $-E. Alternative conceptions of harmony are developed in e.g. Read
(2000) and Tennant (1997, 2008). For an overview see Steinberger (2011a). But
why exactly should I- and E-rules for logical expressions be harmonious?
One motivating thought behind the requirement of harmony is that logic
is innocent: it shouldn’t allow us to prove atomic sentences that we couldn’t
otherwise prove (Steinberger 2009). Yet another motivating thought has it
that I-rules determine, in principle, necessary and sufficient conditions for
introducing complex sentences. The necessity part of this claim is in effect
what Dummett calls the Fundamental Assumption, that ‘[i]f a statement
whose principal operator is one of the logical constants in question can be
established at all, it can be established by an argument ending with one of the
stipulated I-rules’ (Dummett 1991, 252). The Assumption lies at the heart of
the proof-theoretic accounts of validity (Prawitz 1985, Dummett 1991). To see
that it justifies a requirement of harmony, let CG[A] be the canonical grounds
for a complex statement A, as specified by its I-rules. Then, we may reason
that, by the Fundamental Assumption, B follows from CG[A] if and only if
B follows from A itself.11 In short: it is a consequence of the Fundamental
Assumption that complex statements and their grounds, as specified by their
I-rules, must have the same set of consequences. That is, I- and E-rules must
be in harmony with each other in the following sense: one may infer from a
complex statement nothing more, and nothing less, than that which follows
from its I-rules.
If harmony is a necessary condition for logicality, then Prior’s tonk need
not worry the logical inferentialist: the tonk rules are spectacularly dishar-
monious, and hence cannot define a logical connective.12 The rules are also
non-conservative: they allow one to prove sentences in the tonk-free language
that were not previously provable in the absence of the rule for tonk (indeed
they allow us to prove any such sentence). And indeed, the first response to
Prior’s tonk, published by Nuel Belnap in 1962, was precisely that admissible
rules should yield conservative extensions of the base systems to which they
may be added.13
The conservativeness requirement is equivalent to the requirement that
an admissible logical system S be separable, i.e. such that every provable
sentence or rule in the system has a proof that only involves either structural
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rules or rules for the logical operators that figure in that sentence or rule. In
conjunction with UND, separability makes for an atomistic account of one’s
understanding of the logical vocabulary—one according to which to under-
stand $ is to know how to use it correctly, the totality of uses of $ (i.e. the
derivations of rules and theorems involving sentences with $ as their main
logical operator) is derivable from the basic rules for $, and, consequently,
one’s grasp of $’s rules is sufficient for knowing $’s meaning. Thus, on the
foregoing view, a speaker could understand ∧ without understanding ∃,→
without understanding ¬, and so forth. Insofar as our understanding of the
logical vocabulary could be atomistic, it might be argued that an adequate
axiomatisation of logic ought to be separable, on pain of ruling out a possible
way our understanding actually is.
2.3 Inferentialism and logical revision
Proof-theoretic constraints such as harmony, conservativeness, and separabil-
ity rule out Prior’s tonk. However, it may be argued that they rule out much
more. For while the rules of intuitionistic logic are harmonious, standard
formalizations of classical logic typically aren’t (Dummett 1991, Prawitz 1977,
Tennant 1997). For instance, the classical rule of double negation elimination
¬¬A
DN
A
is not in harmony with the standard rule of negation introduction:
[A]i
...
⊥¬-I, i .¬A
The harmonious rule of negation elimination is the following intuitionistic
rule:
A ¬A¬-E .⊥
This rule, unlike its classical counterpart, allows us to infer from ¬A precisely
what was required to assert ¬A: a derivation of ⊥ from A. But, then, double
negation elimination is left, so to speak, in the cold. Similarly, standard
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axiomatisations of classical logic are not separable. For instance, some uses
of → such as Peirce’s Law, that ((A → B) → A) → A, are only derivable
by means of rules for both→ and ¬. Intuitionists such as Dummett, Prawitz
and Tennant have taken this observation to show that classical rules such as
double negation elimination are not logical (or that they are in some other
sense defective), and that the logical rules we should adopt are those of
intuitionistic logic, i.e. classical logic without the Law of Excluded Middle
(A ∨ ¬A), double negation elimination and other equivalent rules (or perhaps
of a weaker logic still (Tennant 1987, 1997)).
This argument is problematic, however. For while it is true that standard ax-
iomatisations of classical logic are not harmonious, a number of non-standard
axiomatisations are both harmonious and separable. In particular, classical
logic can be shown to be as proof-theoretically as respectable as intuitionistic
logic provided rules are given both for asserting and for denying complex
statements (Rumfitt2000, Incurvati and Smith 2009), where denial is taken
to be a primitive speech act distinct from the assertion of a negated sentence
(Parsons 1984, Smiley 1996). The negation rules for classical negation are then
as harmonious as the intuitionistic ones: they allow one to deny ¬A given the
assertion of A and vice versa, and to deny A given the assertion of ¬A and vice
versa.14
Local forms of inferentialism, beyond logical inferentialism, have recently
been developed by a number of authors. For instance, Matthew Chrisman
(2010, 2015) and Ralph Wedgwood (2007) develop an inferentialist account of
deontic modals, Julian Reiss (2012) offers an inferentialist account of causal
claims, Mauricio Suarez (2004) defends an inferential conception of scientific
representation. In the next section, we consider perhaps the most prominent
attempt at elaborating a global inferentialism for language at large.
3 Brandom’s inferentialism
Perhaps the most worked out version of global inferentialism has been put
forward by Robert Brandom (1994, 2000, 2008).15 In this section, we summa-
rize Brandom’s account and situate it with respect to the choice points within
inferentialism identified in §2. Given the expanse of Brandom’s writings and
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the critical literature it gave rise to, our discussion will inevitably have to omit
many noteworthy aspects of Brandom’s work and of the responses to it.
Brandom’s account, like any inferentialist account, is use-theoretic or,
in his preferred vocabulary, pragmatic. Semantics, in Brandom’s slogan,
is ‘answerable to pragmatics’ (Brandom 1994, 83). His account’s point of
departure is the doings of linguistically endowed creatures, in particular their
practices of asserting and inferring which, according to him, ‘come as a
package’ (Weiss and Wanderer, 313). It is through the speech act of assertion
that we advance claims which, in turn, are expressed by declarative sentences.
And it is the contents of these assertions (expressed by declarative sentences)
that are susceptible of standing in inferential relations. It is for this reason that
declarative sentences are taken to be the primary unit of significance and so
enjoy a privileged semantic standing (Brandom 1994, 79).
Aside from being a use theory of meaning, Brandom’s theory may further
thus be classified as an assertibility theory of meaning: the meanings of declar-
ative sentences are to be explained in terms of the conditions under which an
assertion is appropriate or correct. However, Brandom’s approach differs in a
number of significant ways from other types of assertibility theories.
Brandom follows Dummett’s lead in seeking to extend to the whole of
language Gentzen’s bipartite model of the meanings of logical expressions in
terms of I-rules and E-rules (see the previous section). On the proposed pic-
ture, the meaning of a sentence (or of a thought) can be characterized in terms
of the two aspects of its assertoric use: the ‘set of sufficient conditions’ that
would warrant its assertion and the ‘set of necessary consequences’ (Brandom
2000, 63) of doing so’ (as well as, we will see, the set of claims incompatible
with it).
Crucially, the inputs for and the outputs of assertions are construed infer-
entially. That is, the meaning of a sentence is to be explained via its inferential
antecedents and consequences. The meanings of subsentential expressions,
though unfit in and of themselves to act as relata of inferential connections, are
then to be accounted for in terms of the systematic contributions they make
to the assertibility conditions of the sentences of which they are constituents.
Their semantic contributions are accounted for in terms of their substitutional
behavior Brandom (1994, ch. 6). Where Brandom departs from Dummett
is in the deflationary nature of his account. Traditional semantic notions of
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reference and truth are explained in broadly deflationist terms, as having an
‘expressive’ role—they enable us to render explicit certain intentional and
anaphoric features of our practice which otherwise remain implicit within
them Brandom (1994, ch. 5).16
As we noted in §2, certain expressions appear to lend themselves more
readily to inferentialist treatment than others. However, since Brandom’s
account lays claim to global applicability, it must be capable also to account for
observational predicates like ‘red’, for instance. According to Brandom, even
the possession of a color concept like red requires more than merely an ability
to respond differentially to red things. Parrots, barometers and thermometers
all respond differentially to certain stimuli, yet they cannot be credited with
the corresponding concepts. Full conceptual competence presupposes an
appreciation of the inferential connections from and to thoughts containing
the concept in question, e.g. the inference from ‘this is crimson’ to ‘this is red’,
or from ‘this is red’ to ‘this is colored’.
What confers meaning to a sentence is that it may be correctly inferred
from certain sentences, and that other sentences may be inferred from it. This
presupposes an appreciation on the part of the speaker that the sentence
may act as a premise and as a conclusion in arguments.17 In Brandom’s oft-
cited Sellarsian slogan, the meaning-determinative linguistic and conceptual
practices of asserting and inferring are to be conceived of as taking place
within the ‘game of giving and asking for reasons’. His aim is to explain how
our practices of asserting, challenging, defending and retracting assertions
by exploiting the inferential connections within which the asserted contents
stand, are able to confer meanings to the linguistic vehicles by which these
linguistic acts are performed.
Crucially, the meaning-constitutive inferential patterns are not formal infer-
ences (i.e. deductive relations that are truth-preserving in virtue of the logical
forms of the claims), but rather material ones including analytic inferences like
‘Philadelphia is south of New York City; therefore, New York City is north of
Philadelphia’ as well as defeasible a posteriori ones like ‘this substance burns
in a white flame; so, this substance is magnesium’. It is these material inferen-
tial relations (not formal ones) that we rely upon in justifying, challenging and
defending our assertions, and it is therefore they which constitute inferential
roles of sentences.18 The supposed primacy of formal inference is taken to be
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an artifact of the referentialist order of explanation: subsentential expressions
are thought to have semantic values in virtue of the referential relations they
stand in. These semantic values compositionally determine the truth-values of
sentences. And these, together with the logical forms of the sentences, go on to
determine the formal logical consequences of those sentences. On Brandom’s
account, by contrast, it is material inference that takes center stage. Indeed,
logical concepts are inessential to (non-logical) conceptual practices. The role
of logical vocabulary, as that of semantic vocabulary, is expressive, according
to Brandom. It is in virtue of such expressive vocabulary that we are able
to subject our concepts to critical scrutiny, laying bare the commitments we
incur by virtue of operating with those concepts. However, it is not directly
determinative of meaning.19
An important feature of Brandom’s inferentialism, we said, was its bipar-
tite structure of its analysis of assertibility conditions, which it inherits from
Dummett. Like Dummett, Brandom rejects assertibility theories that focus
on the grounds of assertion to the exclusion of the consequences of assertion.
Such one-sided accounts, he claims, are unable to discriminate the meanings
of ‘I will write a book about Hegel’ and ‘I foresee that I will write a book
about Hegel’. For while the circumstances warranting the assertion of either
sentence are the same, the consequences of doing so differ Brandom (2000,
65). One-sided accounts, according to him, are unable to account for that
difference.
Also, much like Dummett, Brandom’s inferentialism is a broadly social
and normative inferentialism. The relevant meaning-determining inferential
roles are the ones that govern not the expressions of a particular idiolect but
those of a public language. What is more, inferential roles, for Brandom, are
not to be construed merely as regularities within a social inferential practice,
but rather as proprieties and so normatively. Where Brandom’s assertibility
theory goes beyond Dummett’s is in that he aims to offer an analysis of the
‘normative fine structure’ of the grounds and the consequences of asserting in
terms of the normative categories of commitment and of entitlement.
Start with commitment. Asserting is a way of expressing one’s endorse-
ment of a proposition. But for such an endorsement to have the distinctive
force of an assertion, it must be subject to the norm that assertions entail
commitments to the material implications of the asserted contents. A speech
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act not accompanied by such a commitment would not qualify as an assertion.
For instance, in asserting that this is red, I commit myself to the claim that
this is colored. Commitment thus has the deontic force of obligation: having
asserted that this is red, I ought also to endorse what follows from the content
of my assertion, e.g. that this is colored.
The second category of entitlement must be understood against the back-
drop of Brandom’s rationalism about language. The practice of asserting,
for him, is essentially bound up with our practice of exchanging reasons.
Upon advancing a claim by asserting it, I may appropriately be challenged
by you. I meet your challenge by demonstrating my entitlement to the claim,
for instance by pointing to a further claim to which I am already entitled and
from which the claim I advance may be correctly inferred. For example, I can
demonstrate my entitlement to the claim that this is red provided that I am
entitled to the claim that this is scarlet. The reason my entitlement carries
over from an assertion of the latter sentence to an assertion of the former, is
because the sentences express contents that stand in an entitlement preserving
inferential relation. While commitments corresponded to the ‘deontic status’
of obligations, we can now see that entitlements correspond to permissions.
The deontic modalities (like other modalities) of obligation and permis-
sion are customarily taken to be duals of one another as witnessed by their
interdefinability with the help of formal negation (e.g. it is obligatory that p
just in case not-p is not permissible and vice versa). Given his conception of
logical vocabulary as having an expressive and hence auxiliary role, Brandom
does not wish to appeal to the formal concept of negation at this explanatorily
fundamental level. Nevertheless, commitments and entitlements interact in
important ways. In particular, Brandom defines a notion of incompatibility or
material negation in terms of them: two propositions are incompatible with
one another just in case commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other.
Aside from being able to give a more refined account of the central notion
of inferential role, Brandom claims that the three additions to his conceptual
tool belt—commitment, entitlement and incompatibility—enable him to deal
with a problem that has long bedeviled assertibility theories of meaning. To
see what the trouble is note that assertions can be said to be correct in two
ways. An assertion can be said to be correct by the lights of the agent or of
the agent’s linguistic community if it is warranted by the relevant standards
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(e.g. ‘Was the evidence properly taken into account?’ ‘Were the inferences
made sound ones?’ and so on). But of course even the individual may be
subjectively correct in this sense by their lights and hence blameless, they may
still be wrong. So there is a second, objective sense in which an assertion’s
correctness may be appraised. In this sense an assertion is correct just in case
it is true, i.e. just in case it tells it how it is. Traditionally, Brandom claims,
assertibility theories have struggled to account for objective correctness in this
sense.
Oftentimes the assertibility theorists resorted to certain types of ideal-
izations in order to narrow the gap between the two types of normative
appraisals by defining objective correctness as subjective correctness under
certain ideal conditions (perfect evidence, at the end of inquiry, etc.). Brandom
believes that idealizing manoeuvres of this kind are doomed to failure. For a
typical problem case consider Brandom’s example:
1. The swatch is red.
2. The claim that the swatch is red is now assertible by me.
Although the second sentence merely seems to make explicit, what according
to the assertibility theorist is implicit in the act of asserting the first sentence,
the two sentences intuitively differ in content. The two sentences, though
assertible in the same circumstances, differ in their truth conditions. However,
Brandom believes that his account delivers the means necessary to capture the
difference in semantic content without abandoning the assertibilist . For the
two sentences to have the same content, they would have to rule out the same
claims; they would have to be, in Brandom’s vocabulary, ‘incompatibility-
equivalent’ Brandom (2000, 199). But this is not the case. For instance, 1. is
compatible with it being the case that rational beings have never evolved,
whereas 2. is not.20
Needless to say, Brandom’s grand project has faced a great number of
criticisms.21 Here we will single out merely one central strand of criticisms
because of its relevance to other inferentialist enterprises: Brandom’s holism.22
In §2, we noted that if inferentialism is to play the part of a metasemantic
account—a theory of MD, of UND or both—it must explain which types of
inferences have the relevant metasemantic relevance; i.e. which inferences
are meaning-determinative or which ones are understanding-constitutive.
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Brandom, we had said, endorses the controversial thesis that all inferential
connections to which the sentence contributes are relevant. We have already
noted some of the intuitive difficulties faced by Brandom’s view qua theory
of understanding. In the following passage Brandom himself stresses in
particular the difficulty of accounting, on a holistic account, for the ‘possibility
of communication or of interpersonal understanding’:
If the inferential significance of a claim depends on what else one
is committed to, then any difference between the collateral com-
mitments of speaker and audience can mean that a remark has a
different significance in the one’s mouth than it does in the other’s
ear. How is it then possible to make sense of the idea that they
understand one another, so as to be able to agree or disagree?
If the contents expressed by sentences must be individuated as
finely as the theories they are embedded in, the intelligibility of
communication across theories—the very notion of conveying
information—is threatened. [. . . ] If, because of his very different
collateral commitments, Rutherford meant something quite dif-
ferent by ‘electron’ than I do, it seems I can’t disagree with him
about whether electrons have fixed positions and orbits, since I
can’t either say or think anything with the content he would have
expressed by saying “electrons orbit the nucleus.” How, then, are
we to understand so much as the possibility of cognitive progress
in science? (Brandom 2007, 168)
How, in the light of this is a holistic account of understanding and commu-
nication to get off the ground? A natural answer, it might be thought, is
to maintain that Rutherford’s and Brandom’s use of ‘electron’ overlap suffi-
ciently to ensure communication; that their uses of the term are sufficiently
similar. However, Fodor and Lepore (2001) and others have argued that such
appeals to similarity will not do. The reason, according to them, is that any
appeal to similarity in use would appeal to related expressions. For instance,
it is of no help to point to the fact that both Brandom and Rutherford may
agree that electrons are negatively charged, because their different theoretical
commitments lead them to assign different meanings to ‘charge’ (see Fodor
and Lepore 2001). However, Brandom takes this conclusion to be too hasty.
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While it may be that many of the inferential roles the two associate with the
expression differ in myriad ways, many of the non-inferential circumstances
under which both would apply the term are the same, or at least sufficiently
similar:
Thus Rutherford and I are both disposed to respond to a bolt of
lightning by applying the term ‘electron’, and to respond to apply-
ing the expression ‘high voltage, high amperage electron flow’ to a
bare piece of metal by avoiding contact with it. These language en-
try and language exit moves, no less than the language-language
ones, also give us something important in common, even when
described at a so-far-subsemantic level, that is, in a nonsemantic
vocabulary. I do not see why the structures so-described do not
underwrite a perfectly intelligible notion of partially shared, or
merely similar inferential roles Brandom (2007, 171).23
Moreover, Brandom dismisses the notion that understanding should be un-
derstood on the ‘Lockean’ model according to which my understanding you
consists in your idea being transferred or reproduced in my mind. Instead,
we should understand ‘understanding’ in accordance with Brandom’s picture
of the normative practices that are constitutive of meanings in the first place.
One’s advancing a sentence assertorically should be understood against the
background of social ‘scorekeeping’ practices in which my interlocutors track
my and others’ commitments and entitlements as a result of my assertion
(see Brandom 1994, 180ff). These scorekeeping practices represent Brandom’s
account of how it is that content-conferring norms are socially instituted.
They are thus to be understood as an attempt at a reductive (though non-
naturalistic) account of content. Contents (and intentionality with them) are
to be understood in terms of the normative practices by which we monitor
and assess our rational discourses of asserting, challenging, justifying and
retracting. ‘The capacity to understand each other’, on this picture, ‘is the
practical ability to navigate across the gulf between doxastic perspectives
created by the effect of differing collateral commitments on the inferential
significance of one noise in the mouth that utters it and the ear that hears
it’ (Brandom 1994, 667). The trouble with this reductive view, however, is
that it seems hard to see how explanatorily basic normative practices can be
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described without already making use of intentional vocabulary (Fodor and
Lepore 2010, Rosen 1997).
Rather, than further dwelling on objections specifically leveled at Brandom,
we now turn to a number of more general objections to inferentialism.
4 Objections and replies
Objections to IRS are legion.24 For reasons of space, we focus on two main
lines of criticism: a general worry about IRS qua unorthodox semantics, and
Timothy Williamson’s recent sustained attack to UND, understood as the claim
that to understand an expression is to be disposed to make and accept basic
inferences featuring it. We begin with the former.
The thought that the content of a sentence in context is given by, perhaps
among other things, its truth-conditions—truth-conditional semantics, for
short—lies at the heart of much of contemporary linguistic semantics and
philosophy of language. As Williamson observes, ‘this simple idea has been
basic to the massive development of mainstream formal semantics over recent
decades, in both linguistics and philosophy of language, for natural and
artificial languages’ Williamson (2010).25 However, Williamson argues, this
simple and fruitful idea is incompatible with IRS. He writes:
If you want an explicit theory of how some particular linguistic
construction contributes to the meanings of sentences in which
it occurs, the inferentialist is unlikely to have one. Better try the
referentialist Williamson (2010).26
The thought seems to be this. Given the empirical success of contemporary
truth-conditional semantics, it would be a mistake to abandon it on philo-
sophical grounds, in favour of an untested, and mostly under-developed,
alternative inferentialist semantic theory, which, at least in its present state,
seems too crude to rigorously account even for fairly common place semantic
of the semantic phenomena. However, our discussion in §1 shows that this
objection may be off target.
The objection conflates the levels of semantics and metasemantics. The
proponent of IRS can in principle be impressed with the advances of refer-
ential semantic theories and indeed endorse them, while maintaining that
27
meta-semantic questions—MD and UND—call, in whole or in part, for an
inferentialist treatment. In §2, we called inferentialists of this type orthodox.
The inferentialist at the level of metasemantics then faces the further question
as to how the referentialist’s semantic values are to interpreted: Are they to be
taken at face-value metaphysically or not? That is, in our terminology, is the
inferentialist a genuine (orthodox) inferentialist or a deflationary one? As for
MD, several authors (see e.g. Peacocke 1992, Hodes 2004, MacFarlane 2005)
have maintained that an inferentialist account of MD as applied to logical
expressions is compatible with truth-conditional semantics for them—indeed,
in suitable presentations of classical logic, inference rules fix the semantic
interpretation of the logical vocabulary (e.g. Smiley 1996, Rumfitt 2000). The
same is true for other expressions, such as deontic modals (see e.g. Wedgwood
2007, Chrisman 2010) and indeed perhaps for the whole of language. Among
these authors, some might advocate genuine variants (e.g. Wedgwood (2007))
others deflationary variants of deflationism (e.g. Brandom 1994, 2000).
Williamson, however, remains skeptical. He writes:
Since inferential relations do not fix truth and reference, meaning
has not been adequately tied to the language-independent world
(Williamson 2010).
But Williamson simply presupposes the falsity of metasemantic interpretations
of MD. Pending an argument for this presupposition, it seems fair to conclude
that the general worry against inferentialism has little to go on.
Let us turn, then, to the second general line of criticism. In a number of
publications, Williamson has launched a sustained attack afflicting, according
to him, various ‘programs which go under titles such as “conceptual role
semantics”, “inferentialism” and “use theories of meaning”’ (Williamson 2006,
6, n. 5). Once again it is important to situate Williamson’s objections within
the map of inferentialist positions laid out in §2. The target of Williamson’s
criticism is the inferentialist’s claim to be able to account for UND; it in no
way concerns MD. What is more, Williamson’s criticisms presuppose that
understanding a sentence, for the inferentialist, is constituted by a grasp of
certain epistemically analytic inferential relations. For instance, as we have
seen, it may be a necessary condition in order to count as understanding ‘and’
that one appropriately recognizes the correctness of the inferential relation
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from pA and Bq to A and to B. The assumption, here, is that there must
be some salient subset of the inferential relations an expression enters into
that is constitutive of understanding it. Hence, on Williamson’s picture, the
inferentialist is committed to a version of epistemic analyticity in the sense
of Boghossian (1996, 1997, 2003). It is a consequence of this that, necessarily,
someone who understands a given sentence, appropriately accepts certain
inferences from and to that sentence. Williamson’s objection to inferentialist
theories of understanding do not, therefore, tell against theories of this type
that do not rely on epistemic analyticity in this way. It is at least worth
noting that not all inferentialist accounts of understanding are committed to
epistemic analyticity in this way; our discussion of Brandom’s holism in the
previous section is a case in point.
What, then, does Williamson’s objection amount to? For simplicity, we
summarize the objection as it is directed against any form of analyticity-
based account of understanding; inferentialism amounts to a special case.
His take-home message is this: understanding is an elastic notion—it cannot
be adequately captured by any account that ties understanding to neces-
sary conditions on the assent-dissent patterns of individual speakers or their
acceptance of certain inferential relations. Consider the sentence
(Vixen) Every vixen is a female fox.
According to UND, necessarily, whoever understands Vixen assents to it. It
is constitutive of one’s understanding of ‘vixen’ that under suitable condi-
tions (e.g. provided one understands the remaining words occurring in the
sentence), one assents to Vixen. Call a theory of understanding of this general
form a criterial theory of understanding. Williamson provides a recipe for
generating counterexamples to any such theory.
Suppose e is an expression, m its meaning. According to a criterial account
of understanding, there must be a sentence or pattern of inference C(e) such
that a speaker’s assent to it or appropriate recognition of it is necessary for
her to count as understanding e. Williamson claims to have a general recipe
for cooking up counterexamples to any such C(e), for any e. Namely, we can
imagine an expert on m who, on (possibly erroneous) theoretical grounds,
rejects C(e). By the criterialist’s standards our expert does not understand
e. But surely, by any ordinary standards, she does understand e—she is an
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expert, after all.
In order to get a better feel for the foregoing schematic objection, let
us consider one of its instances. Suppose, as seems prima facie reasonable
from the inferentialist’s point of view, that an appropriate appreciation of
modus ponens (MP) is constitutive of understanding ‘if’. As for any case,
Williamson believes a counterexample can be concocted also for this case.
That is, a counterexample in which an expert whose semantic competence
cannot reasonably be questioned rejects the criterial pattern of inference or
sentence. Indeed, no concocting is even needed in this case, Williamson thinks:
in Vann McGee we already have a ready-made, real-life example of someone
who is undeniably an expert about conditionals but nevertheless denies the
validity of MP. His denial is founded on a number well-known putative
counterexamples involving nested conditionals (see e.g. McGee 1985, 462).
For present purposes, it does not matter if McGee is right—we may even
suppose that his example is fallacious, and that ‘if’ in English satisfies MP after
all.27 What matters is that, his erroneous views about MP notwithstanding,
McGee surely understands ‘if’. All the same, according to UND it seems we
must say that he does not. So UND must be false, or so Williamson argues.
Williamson constructs structurally similar cases for the material condi-
tional, for ‘for all’ and for ‘and’ (Williamson 2003, 2007, 2011, 2012). His
conclusion is that agreement in understanding doesn’t require perfect agree-
ment in use. All that is needed for a speaker to understand an expression
of e is that she fully participate in the social practice of using e within her
linguistic community. He writes:
Each individual uses words as words of a public language; their
meanings are constitutively determined not individually but so-
cially, through the spectrum of linguistic activity across the com-
munity as a whole. The social determination of meaning requires
nothing like an exact match in use between different individuals;
it requires only enough connection in use between them to form a
social practice. Full participation in that practice constitutes full
understanding. (Williamson 2007, 91)
Williamson’s argument, then, is premised on what is sometimes referred to
as social externalism (Burge 1979, Burge 1986): linguistic understanding is
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always understanding of a public language whose meanings are typically
non-individualistically individuated. On the assumption that the community-
wide use of ‘if’ largely conforms to MP, it is this assumption that allows
Williamson to maintain that McGee’s understanding of ‘if’ is unaffected by his
rejection of certain instances of the rule. How can the inferentialist respond?
We begin with two observations about the scope of the argument. To begin,
the objection does not target IRS directly. Rather, it aims at undermining a
certain account of understanding that can be—and typically is—associated
with it. What is more, the argument does not apply to holistic versions of IRS,
such as Brandom’s. According Brandom’s inferentialism, one’s understanding
of an expression e is constituted by one’s grasp of the entire network of
inferential connections in which e participates. But, since such a totality
typically slightly varies from speaker to speaker, it may be argued that it
is to be expected, on Brandom’s view, that different speakers understand e
equally well, and yet associate it with different inferential roles. That being
said, however, semantic holism is a highly controversial view (Dummett 1991,
Pagin 1997). Let us therefore consider possible lines of response in defence of
non-holistic versions of UND.
Boghossian (2012) has recently suggested the following inferentialist re-
sponse. In his view, McGee understands ‘if’, but he understands it differently.
His deviant use simply shows that he attaches a different meaning to ‘if’. As
he puts it:
All that the inferential role theorist is committed to saying is that,
if [Vann] succeeds in altering his behavior with [‘if’] and flouts a
meaning-constituting rule [. . . ], then he necessarily means some-
thing different by ‘if’ [. . . ] It is better to call this “meaning change”
rather than incompetence. (Boghossian 2012, 232)
As it stands, however, Boghossian’s response is problematic. It is premised on
an idiolectic version of MD (see p. 13, fn. 3) which is flatly inconsistent with
the social externalism assumed by Williamson’s criticism. It may be that such
idiolectic conceptions are ultimately more congenial to the inferentialist. Yet, it
is an interesting question whether the inferentialist can respond to Williamson
on his own terms. While we lack the space to develop a full response, we
canvass the general shape such a response might take.
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We begin with the observation that Boghossian’s meaning-change ap-
proach is especially compelling in cases that are very similar to the ones
Williamson considers. Consider, for instance, the case of a full-blooded intu-
itionist and of a classical logician—call them Michael and Tim, respectively—
and let us assume that they are both highly proficient logicians. Arguably,
Michael and Tim have a different understanding of ‘not’ (DeVidi and Solomon
2001, Dummett 2007, Dummett 2008).28 It might be argued, then, that it would
be problematic to insist, faced with such a difference, that intuitionist and
classical logicians have the same understanding of ‘not’. After all, intuitionists
consciously use ‘not’ differently. For instance, unlike classical logicians, they
refuse to assent to certain instances of the Law of Excluded Middle. It would
not do justice to their semantic beliefs to insist that, in spite of their avowed
intention to use ‘not’ according to its intuitionist meaning, ‘not’ means classi-
cal negation in their mouth. Intuitionists reject the classical meaning of ‘not’,
and there is a coherent, if arguably ultimately untenable, intuitionist meaning
of ‘not’. The same, it might be contended, applies to the McGee case.
But wouldn’t this be, once again, inconsistent with Williamson’s social
externalism? Here it helps to observe that both Michael and Tim are, we are
assuming, experts who have very close to full understanding. What makes
them experts is that they are able to make authoritative pronouncements—
what Burge (1986) calls ‘normative characterizations’—-regarding the criteria
for correctly applying expressions related appropriately to their area of com-
petence. They are in the business of investigating and explicitly articulating the
rules we ought to follow. They are, in Kaplan’s distinction, language ‘creators’
as opposed to be mere ‘consumers’ (Kaplan 1989, 811). And since they can
help shape a linguistic community’s linguistic standards, in view of their
divergences in the use of ‘not’, they may be plausibly viewed as belonging to
different linguistic communities. It will not do to insist, as Williamson does,
that small differences in use don’t make a difference in understanding. In the
present context, they do. It is only natural that the pronouncements of two
experts be carefully examined. Even a small difference in the rules governing
the use of an expression e is likely to imply a difference in that expression’s
content, on the natural assumption (shared by all parties) that such a content
validates the rules for e’s correct use.
So much, then, for experts. What should the inferentialist say about Joe
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Shmoe’s small but systematic deviance with respect to a given expression e?
Wouldn’t it be patronising to claim that, because he doesn’t conform to the
community-wide use of e, he doesn’t understand e Williamson 2003, 2007)?
Here one should consider two cases. If Joe defers to experts, i.e. if, for instance,
he is disposed to be corrected by them, then it is open to the inferentialist—
in keeping with Williamson’s social externalism—to maintain that it is the
experts’ dispositions that determine e’s meaning, and that are constitutive
of Joe’s understanding of e. If, on the other hand, Joe does not defer to
experts, and stubbornly insists in using e in a deviant way, then it would seem
appropriate to say that Joe indeed has an idiosyncratic understanding of e: he
understands e differently.
The inferentialist, then, might respond to Williamson’s challenge by in-
sisting that his examples all involve a discrepancy in use among experts.
Williamson’s key argumentative move, the inferentialist might diagnose, is to
treat experts as non-experts, and to discard, for this reason, their idiosyncratic
use of certain expressions as irrelevant for those expressions’ meaning and
understanding. Yet, by the social externalist’s own lights, experts—language
creators—who use a given expression in different ways, should be credited
with different understandings of that expression.
If the foregoing considerations are along the right track, it would seem
that Williamson’s central objection to CRS misses its target after all. To be sure,
much more remains to be said. For instance, the inferentialist who pursued
a response to Williamson along these lines would have to explain how, for
instance, rival logicians might be able to disagree about the validity of what
would intuitively seem to be the same logical law. A disagreement about
the Law of Excluded Middle, on the foregoing view, would no longer be
about whether A ∨ ¬A is valid or not, but, say, about whether ‘not’ and ‘or’
in English should be interpreted classically or intuitionistically. The question
whether this is a plausible feature of the view, or an unpalatable consequence,
is, as far as we can see, still very much open.
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Notes
1Stalnaker (1997) uses the labels ‘descriptive semantics’ and ‘foundational semantics’ to
make the same distinction. We follow the terminology in Kaplan (1989), which by now is
fairly well established. Brandom’s labels ‘formal semantics’ and ‘philosophical semantics’
seem to designate the same distinction. See Brandom (1994, 143) and Weiss and Wanderer
(2010, 342). for formulations of Brandom’s distinction.
2The level of thought is treated analogously:
(CD) Content determination. The contents of concepts are determined by their
role in inference.
(GRA) Grasping. To grasp a concept is to know its role in inference.
3See e.g. Brandom’s deflationary notions of reference and truth in his (1994), as well as the
discussion between Dummett and Brandom (Weiss and Wanderer, 2010, Ch. 13 & 29).
4That said, certain local forms of IRS do proclaim a (local) atomism. Neil Tennant (1987,
1997), for instance, argues for a form of atomistic IRS about logical concepts. On such a
view, the meaning of any logical operator is independent of that of the other other logical
operators (indeed independent of any other expressions). Analogously, understanding a
logical operator does not presuppose antecedent understanding of any other logical operators.
5But see our discussion of Brandom’s holism in §3 below.
6Block (1986), Loar (1981), Harman (1999), Peacocke (1992) belong to this camp.
7Proponents of normative versions of IRS include Boghossian (2003), Brandom (1994),
Dummett (1991), Wedgwood (2007), Whiting (2009).
8See e.g. Popper (1947, 220), Kneale (1956, 254-5), and Dummett (1991, 247).
9Dummett correctly observes that while
it may [. . . ] be that the [representational] meanings of the logical constants [i.e.
the truth-functions they denote] are determined by the logical laws that govern
their use in deductive arguments [. . . ] this cannot be assumed—it needs to be
shown. (Dummett 1991, 205)
Carnap (1943) first showed that, in standard natural deduction systems, the rules for ∨, ¬, and
→ fail to determine their standard truth-conditions. Thus, it would seem, standard natural
deduction systems are not hospitable at least to certain interpretations ofMD. However, while
this is sometimes thought to be a problem (see e.g. Raatikainen 2008), it need not be. For one
thing, on certain assumptions, the rules still determine the standard intuitionistic meanings of
∨, ¬, and→ (Garson 2001). For another, in slightly less standard, though arguably equally
‘natural’, natural deduction systems, the classical I- and E-rules for ∨, ¬, and→ do determine
their truth-conditions (see e.g. Smiley 1996, Rumfitt 2000)
10For instance, a connective  satisfying the standard I-rules for ∧ but only one of its
E-rules would be intrinsically harmonious, and yet intuitively disharmonious: its E-rule
would not allow us to infer from A B all that was required to introduce A B in the first
place.
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11Right-to-left: suppose B follows from A. Since A also follows from CG[A], B itself
follows from CG[A]. Left-to-right: suppose B follows from CG[A]. Now assume A. By the
Fundamental Assumption, CG[A] itself follows. Hence, on our assumption that B follows
from CG[A], we may conclude B, as required.
12Whether harmony is also a sufficient condition for logicality is a more delicate question.
See Read (2000).
13See also e.g. Hacking (1979, 237-8) and Dummett (1991, 217-18), and the discussion in
Steinberger (2011a).
14Alternatively, harmonious axiomatisations of classical logic can be given once multiple
conclusions are allowed (Read 2000, Cook 2005), either in a natural deduction or in a sequent-
calculus setting. Sequent calculi axiomatisations of intuitionistic and classical logic are exactly
alike, except that classical sequent calculi allow for sequents with multiple premises and
multiple conclusions. In turn, such sequents can be plausibly interpreted as saying that
one may not assert all the antecedents and deny all the succedents, where, again, assertion
and denial are both primitive speech acts (Restall 2005). For a technical introduction to
multiple-conclusion logics, see ShoesmithSmiley (1978). For a recent criticism, see Steinberger
(2011b).
15We should stress that Brandom is but one proponent of a global form of inferentialism.
For some representative publications on various global brands of CRS, see e.g. Sellars (1956),
Harman (1987), Field (1977, 1994, 2001), Block1987, Block (1998), Cozzo (1994), Horwich
(1998), Peacocke (1992), Boghossian (2003, 2003a, 2012, 2012a), Whiting (2006, 2008, 2009),
Chalmers (2014). For reasons of space, we only focus on Brandom’s work, on account of its
influence, and of the detail in which the views have been worked out over the years.
16For a criticism of Brandom’s deflationary approach see Shapiro (2004). See MacFarlane
(2010) for an interesting objection to Brandom’s assumption that a use-theoretic approach is
incompatible with a truth-conditional approach.
17As we noted in section §2, there will be extremal cases—language-entry rules—in which
the grounds for inferring a sentence may be perceptual; and in which the consequences of
asserting a sentences will be non-linguistic.
18Brandom explicitly follows Sellars on this point Brandom (1994, 97).
19See in particular Brandom’s discussion of Dummett’s inferentialist treatment of pejora-
tives Brandom (2000, 69ff). See Williamson (2009) for a stern referentialist reprisal.
20The exchange between Hale and Wright and Brandom is illuminating in this regard. See
WeissWanderer (2010, Ch. 17 & Ch. 33).
21For an impression of the breadth of criticisms inspired by his Brandom (1994) alone, read-
ers may consult, e.g. the book symposium in a special issue of Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research (Vol. 57, No. 1, 1997), of and Weiss and Wanderer (2010).
22For more discussion on semantic holism, see e.g. Dummett (1991), Harman (1993), Pagin
(1997, 2006), Cozzo (2002).
23See Brandom (1994, 666) for more detailed discussion.
24For an incomplete sample, see e.g. Fodor and Lepore (1991), Casalegno (2004), Williamson
(2003), Williamson (2007), Williamson (2009), Williamson (2012), Horwich (2005), Besson
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(2010), Enoch and Schechter (2006), Dogramaci (2012). For some inferentialist responses
beyond the ones cited below, see e.g. Eklund (2007), Balcerak Jackson (2009), and Murzi and
Steinberger (2013).
25The same point is also forcefully made, inter alia in Jason Stanley’s introduction to Stanley
(2007).
26See also Williamson (2007, 282).
27If McGee is right, and ‘if’ actually does not satisfy MP, contrary to what we’re assuming,
then expert speakers who infer according to the unrestricted rule of MP would serve as
purported counterexamples to UND.
28Intuitionist and classical negation (respectively, ∼ and ¬) have different meanings on
most intuitionist semantics. For instance, on the standard BHK semantics ∼A means that
there is no proof of A, i.e. that it is impossible to prove A. Given the intuitionist’s equation
of truth with the existence of a proof, the impossibility of proving A in turn entails that A
can’t be true. Similarly, on the standard Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic, ∼A is forced
by a state of information w if and only if no possible development of w forces A. This modal
component is arguably absent in classical negation (DeVidi and Solomon 2001, Dummett
2007, Dummett 2008).
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